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Abstract 
 
This thesis report examines the impact on trade, within the European Union, of an 
EMU membership and a direct fixed exchange rate regime during the period 2003-
2012. This has been done using the gravity model of trade and three different 
estimation techniques, the Pooled OLS model, the fixed effects model and the random 
effects model. Previous research in this area has focused on estimating the trade 
effects in a global perspective. As far as we are aware, this report is the first to study 
this topic in a strictly European context. Since the composition of countries using a 
common currency apart from the Eurozone, to a large extent, consists of small and 
poor countries our estimated results, from a data set with a high concentration of 
OECD countries, are an interesting benchmark to earlier studies. Our core result 
indicates that two members of the EMU trade 9.3 % more between each other than if 
one of the countries is a member of the EMU and the other has a direct fixed 
exchange rate to the euro.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  	  
Europe is currently experiencing the aftermath of the Euro crisis with the imminent 
risk that a new one is lurking behind the corner, with the state of the public finances 
in some of the southern European countries in mind. This has led to a situation where 
voices are being raised about how the pros and cons of the euro project really add up. 
One of the main arguments for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is that it 
promotes trade and recent studies on this subject states that the EMU indeed has a 
positive impact on trade. This thesis will study whether a country can keep its national 
currency, and all the benefits this entails, and still gain trade benefits in level with an 
EMU membership by setting up a direct fixed exchange rate regime1 to the euro. In 
other words, is it possible to eat the cake and have it to? We will analyse this by 
estimating the impact on trade of an EMU membership and a direct fixed exchange 
rate regime using a gravity model. Similar studies have been done but never, as far as 
we are aware, in a strictly European context. The results obtained from this research 
are thereby unique and a contribution to the always ongoing debate concerning 
exchange rate regimes. Adam and Cobham (2007) emphasized the relevance in 
studying the impact of exchange rate regimes on trade in Europe because of the fact 
that the estimations from such a data set, consisting of high concentration of OECD 
countries, would be interesting to compare with those done with a global focus2.  
 
1.1 Research question 
Our hypothesis is stated so that it is in line with findings from previous research: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Direct fixed exchange rate and direct peg are used as synonyms, the same implies for indirect fixed 
exchange rate and indirect peg. A fixed exchange rate is used as a general term to highlight that one or 
several countries fix their domestic currency to the currency of the base country.	  2	  Adam ans Cobham (2007) states in their conclusion:” However, the research reported here leaves 
open a number of avenues that need to be explored, and on which we are currently working. First, an 
extended data set which covers the first five or so years of EMU will allow better estimates of the 
effects of currency unions because such a data set (unlike the present one) will include unions between 
advanced countries.” 	  
2	  	  
 
H0: During the period 2003-2012 an EMU membership has exceeded a direct fixed 
exchange rate regime to the euro in terms of gains in intra-EU bilateral trade.  
 
H1: H0 not true. 
 
1.2 Background - The EMU and the ERM II 
 
In 1999 the monetary system in Europe was fundamentally changed due to the 
introduction of the euro. This was another step to further strengthen the market 
integration in Europe that, among other things, facilitate for trade between the 
European countries. The currency union initially consisted of eleven member 
countries; a figure that today has been expanded to eighteen (The European 
Commission, 2014). The decision to implement the euro was taken in 1992 from the 
agreement of the Maastricht Treaty, which set up the rules of the introduction. Among 
other things it states the conditions a country needs to meet to be able to join the 
currency union. These conditions are known as the convergence criteria and address 
issues as required levels of inflation, public debt, interests rates and exchange rate 
fluctuations (Krugman and Obsfeldt, 2006).   
      One criteria concern participation in the European Monetary System’s exchange 
rate mechanism (ERM II) and is of specific interest in our research since it has had 
significant repercussions on the exchange rate regime landscape in Europe.  The 
criteria states that the member state must have participated in the ERM II for the 
preceding two years without severe exchange rate fluctuations and must also not have 
devalued its currency in that period. The ERM II was set up in 1999, when it replaced 
the ERM, to safeguard that exchange rate fluctuations does not interfere with the 
economic stability in Europe (European Commission, 2014). The operating 
procedures are determined in agreement between the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the central bank of the nation in question. Fluctuation margins of +/- 15 % are set 
up around an agreed central rate. The ECB has the power to initiate a procedure with 
the purpose to change the rate (De Grauwe, 2012). 
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      Table A3 in the appendix shows the distinct relationship between the presence of 
ERM II and the amount of nations that have used a fixed exchange rate regime in 
Europe during the period 2003-2012. It should be pointed out that the fluctuation 
possibilities incorporated in the ERM II agreements makes it somewhat of a stretch to 
call it per definition a fixed exchange rate regime. We have addressed this fact by 
using exchange rate volatility terms to get a suitable selection, but more on that later. 
However, the ERM II does not give the whole picture regarding the fixed exchange 
rate regimes in Europe since there are countries, Bulgaria and Hungary, that have 
exercised a fixed exchange rate regime in the period 2003-2012 despite not at any 
time been participating in the ERM II. Both countries had problems with high levels 
of inflation during the end of the 1990’s and this was a significant factor for them to 
adopt a fixed exchange rate regime (Moghadam, 1998) (Gulde, 1999). Currently the 
ERM II consists of only two countries, Denmark and Lithuania. Denmark has not a 
pronounced intention to join the EMU but is involved in the ERM II at a +/- 2.25 % 
fluctuations margin. Lithuania on the other hand has been required to postpone their 
entry to the EMU because of too high levels of inflation (European Commission, 
2006).          
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Chapter 2 - Theory and previous research  
2.1 Previous research  
 
The starting point of the last decade’s research concerning common currency and 
trade can be attributed to Andrew Rose (2000). Rose’s extraordinary finding that 
countries using the same currency trade three times as much as they would if they 
used different currencies got a major impact in the academic world. Rose studied 
bilateral trade between 186 countries in the period 1970 to 1990 using a gravity model 
and cross-sectional data. Since currency unions are rare, a majority of the 
observations referred to trade between countries with different currencies and only 
about one per cent of the observations concerned country pairs involving countries 
using the same currency. Despite this fact his findings were statistically significant.  
      The subsequent research used Rose’s results as a benchmark and it did not take 
long until criticism arose. The name of the report “Honey, I shrunk the currency union 
effect on trade” quite obviously stated the author, Volker Nitsch’s, view on the topic. 
Nitsch presented results that showed how minor changes in the data set, used by Rose, 
got major implications in the results and he argued that the effect was exaggerated. 
One substantial characteristic in the data set is that countries using a common 
currency typically are small and poor, for example countries using the East Caribbean 
dollar. Another characteristic in Rose’s data is small and poor countries that have 
adopted a currency from a larger economy, for example island states in the Pacific 
adopting the Australian dollar, a phenomenon called dollarization (Nitsch 2001).  
      Torsten Persson criticised the gravity model used by Rose on the basis that the 
observations of trade amongst countries with the same currency were so few. Persson 
stated that “Rose’s finding of a huge treatment effect of a common currency on 
bilateral trade are likely to reflect systematic selection into common currencies of 
country pairs with peculiar results” (Persson 2001). 
      If we put it in a European context; what is the EMU’s impact on bilateral trade? 
Once again Andrew Rose plays a significant role with his research done together with 
Eric van Wincoop (2001). Their research is an extension of Rose’s previous one and it 
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is based on trade statistics in the period 1970 to 1995, but the authors are now making 
regional breakdowns. They estimated that the eleven initial members of the EMU 
would have increased their overall trade with 59 % if they had used a common 
currency during the years 1970 to 1995. The statistics include multilateral residence 
effects to be more accurate.  
      Other studies on the subject have been conducted by Faraquee (2004), Micco, 
Stien and Ordonez (2003) and De Nardis and Vicarelli (2003). These all indicate that 
the EMU have had a positive impact on trade, though in lesser terms then those 
presented by Rose and Wincoop (2001). All studies use a similar technique, the 
gravity model, but their data is comprised of slightly different variables. In summary 
their estimated results indicate that the EMU has had a positive impact on bilateral 
trade in the range of 2-8 % for its members.  
      Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 70’s, numerous 
studies have been published to examine the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade. 
The underlying concept is that less exchange rate volatility gives more stability and 
should promote trade, therefore should a fixed exchange rate regime have a positive 
impact on trade. Despite the logic in this there has been no coherency in the empirical 
studies stating that this is true. Most studies have found no evidence that exchange 
rate volatility impact trade, for example van Wincoop and Banchetta (2000) and 
Tenreyro (2007). McKenzie (2002) made a compilation of previous research on this 
topic and reached the conclusion that; ”the empirical literature contains the same 
mixed results as the evidence provided by world trade data most commonly fails to 
reveal a significant relationship. However, where a statistically significant 
relationship has been derived, they indicate a positive and negative relationship 
seemingly at random.” 
      One study with a different approach is Klein and Shambaugh’s (2004). Their 
research indicates that a direct fixed exchange rate regime has a significant positive 
impact on bilateral trade. Their panel data consist of 181 countries and the 
observation period is 1973-1999. The result, using country pair fixed effects, implies 
a 21 % increase in trade of using a direct fixed exchange rate regime compared to not 
using one, everything else equal. The difference with this study, compared to previous 
ones, is that the authors measure the significance on dummy variables representing if 
6	  	  
there is a direct fixed or indirect fixed exchange rate between countries. Previous 
studies have estimated the effects of a fixed exchange rate on trade by multiplying the 
estimated coefficients of the exchange rate volatility terms by a given change in 
exchange rate volatility and exchange rate volatility squared respectively, with results 
that implies minor effects of fixed exchange rates on trade. Klein and Shambaugh also 
measure the effect on trade of being a member of a currency union. Their results, 
using country pair fixed effects, implies that a pair of countries that are members of 
the same currency union trade 38% more than an otherwise similar pair, this result is 
not statistically significant though.  
      Adam and Cobham (2007), the research we referred to in the introduction, used 
the same dummy variable estimation technique as Klein and Shambaugh (2004) but 
expanded the area of interest to not only include fixed exchange rate regimes but 
various ones. Using a pooled OLS gravity model they presented results indicating not 
only a great treatment effect of being member of a currency union but also that a fixed 
exchange rate regime fosters trade and, not the least, that it is a sliding scale, 
indicating that the stronger the ties are to the base currency the greater is the positive 
impact on trade. Trade between members of a currency union was 139.8 % higher 
then it would be if they were non-members. Furthermore they found that if one 
country was a member of a currency union and the other country pegged to this 
currency, the trade increased with 56.8% compared to if this relationship did not exist. 
Their results concerning if both countries have a floating regime implied a negative 
impact of 17.6 % on trade. The relationships indicated by Klein and Shambaugh 
(2004) and Adam and Cobham (2007) are the ones we want to study in a European 
perspective since, as stated earlier, the composition of countries being members of 
currency unions globally does not reflect the European context.  
2.2 Theoretical framework  
 
Even if the number of empirical studies comparing trade effects of currency unions 
and fixed exchange rate regimes are limited, there are consensus among these that 
currency unions foster trade to a greater extent. In this section we try to identify what 
in the structure of the two regimes that cause this order. The focus is directed at the 
issues of transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty and how these affect 
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bilateral trade.   
      Robert Copeland (2008) defines a monetary union as: “one (zone)3 where the 
accepted means of payment consists either of a single, homogeneous currency or of 
two or more currencies linked by an exchange rate that is fixed (at one for one) 
irrevocably”. This definition underlines the fact that a currency union in many ways 
resembles a system of fixed exchange rate regimes, but in the same time the two 
systems differ in essential areas.  
      Robert Mundell’s theory of Optimum Currency Areas highlights two major 
benefits of a common currency; the elimination of transaction costs and a better 
performance of money as a medium of exchange and as a unit of account (Ricci, 
2008).  The Commission of the European Community (1990) describes the direct 
benefits from a monetary union to be; “the elimination of exchange rate related 
transaction costs and the suppression of exchange rate uncertainty”. 
      The matter of transaction cost is straightforward. When adopting a common 
currency the need for currency exchange transactions within the currency union, and 
the cost associated with these, vanish. With regards to the extreme amount of euros 
traded daily in the money market, this adds up to a significant amount. Estimations 
concerning the total transaction cost figure, associated with euro transactions, have 
been found to be in the range of 0.25 % to 0.5 % of EU’s GDP (De Grauwe, 2012). In 
this perspective the national currency is a barrier of trade since it carries transaction 
costs.  
      The issue of exchange rate uncertainty between countries disappears if they both 
adopt a common currency. The same applies if one country pegs its currency to the 
other, but in this case it is a matter of the construction of the peg. The benefit of the 
reduction of exchange rate uncertainty is related to the theory of the risk-averse 
investor. Faced with investment or trade opportunities, investors are likely to be less 
enthusiastic when the decision involves the risk of currency fluctuations (Copeland, 
2008). However, the existence of forward and futures markets reduce the influence of 
exchange rate fluctuations on trade and, as stated earlier, research have not been 
successful in finding a causal relationship between exchange rate fluctuations and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Authors	  remark	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trade reduction. Even so, sharing a common currency is a much more serious and a 
more durable commitment than a fixed exchange rate (Rose, 2000).  
      So far we have presented information that emphasizes benefits of a common 
currency over a fixed exchange rate regime. A quick look at the European economic 
landscape makes it quite clear that also this coin has two sides. The primary 
disadvantage with joining a monetary union is that the country gives up its monetary 
independence, which is a fundamental tool to react to changes in the economic 
environment as well as strengthen the nation’s competitiveness in terms of trade 
(Fregert and Jonung, 2010).  
      The same argument can be used against a fixed exchange rate regime. Under a 
fixed exchange rate regime it is the obligation of the central bank to make sure that 
the exchange rate is kept. As a consequence of this the central bank cannot deviate 
from this duty by changing the money supply or interest rate if it is not in the purpose 
of retaining the exchange rate (Burda and Wyplosz, 2009). The monetary 
independence is therefore undermined. But what is a major difference between being 
a member of a currency union and having a fixed exchange rate regime is the relative 
flexibility of changing system if the current one does not benefit the country’s 
economic performance. If we put this in context; it would be a much larger operation 
for example Greece to leave the EMU, which has been discussed in recent years, then 
it would be for Denmark to leave the ERM II. What we want to point out is that 
joining a currency union is to a large extent a point of no return, a description that 
does not reflect the situation for a 
country with a fixed exchange rate 
regime.  
You can explain the reasoning 
behind the decision to join a 
monetery union or setting up a 
fixed exchange rate regime with 
the LL-GG schedule; it all comes 
down to the level of economic 
integration. Setting up a fixed 
exchange rate will give the country 
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gains in monetary efficiency, because of the removal of exchange rate fluctuations 
with the currency it pegs to. Joining a currency union is one step further in the pursue 
of monetary efficiency. On the other hand the country gives up its possibility of using 
the exchange rate and monetary policy when either setting up a fixed exchange 
regime and even more so when joining monetary union. Figure 1 shows how the level 
of economic integration and the gains and losses covary. The stronger the economic 
integration is the greater the incentive is in pegging the currency, or even joining the 
monetary union.  
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Chapter 3 - Data and Methodology  
3.1 The Gravity Model 
 
Ernst Georg Ravenstein first introduced the gravity model in the 19th century to 
explain migration patterns. The person to apply the gravity model on the issue of trade 
was Jan Tinberg, who gave birth to the traditional gravity model of trade in 1962 
(Soloaga and Winters, 1999). The model derives from Newton’s universal law of 
gravitation and describes the trade flows between two countries. The model explains 
the trade flows, in a certain period of time, as proportional to the economic size of the 
two countries (often measured in GDP or GNP) and inversely proportional to the 
distance between them. This equation is often argued to be the foundation for 
estimating trade diversion and trade creation (Krugman and Obsfeldt, 2006). 
 
 T!" = A×   !!×!!!!"  
 
Variable Explanation 
Tij   The total trade between country i and j. 
A Constant 
Yi Indicator of the economic size of country i, often defined by its GDP 
or GNP.   
Yj Indicator of the economic size of country j, often defined by its GDP 
or GNP. 
Dij The distance between country i and country j. 
 
The model has proven stable over time in a variety of empirical studies including 
different countries and methodologies. Empirical evidence also displays that the 
impact of economic size and distance is stabile across time periods. The gravity 
model can be written and extended in numerous ways depending on the research in 
question (Chaney, 2011). 
      When creating our modified version of the gravity model, presented later in this 
chapter, we have taken influence from the model used by Klein and Shambaugh 
(2004). As mentioned previously Klein and Shambaugh used the model to estimate 
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the impact of fixed exchange rate regimes on trade. The gravity model used in their 
research had the following structure:  
 ln  (T!,!,!)   = α!X!,!,! + α!Z!,! + β!F!,!,!,! +   β!F!,!,!,! + β!CU!,!,! + β!v!,!,! + β!v!,!,!! + Ɛ!,!,! 
 
Variable Explanation 
ln(Ti,j,t) The natural logarithm of trade between country i and j at time t. 
Xi,j,t A set of variables that vary over time (e.g. GDP). 
Zi,j A set of variables that do not vary over time (e.g. distance). 
F1,i,j,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was a fixed exchange rate, but no currency union, between country 
i and country j at time t. 
F2,i,j,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was an indirect peg between country i and country j at time t. 
CUi,j,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was a currency union amongst country i and country j at time t.  
Vi,j,t A measure of volatility of the exchange rate between country i and country j at time t. 
Ɛi,j,t Error term at time t. 
 
3.2 Pooled OLS, Fixed effects model and Random effects model 
 
We will make use of three different types of models to perform our regression 
analysis; pooled OLS, fixed effects model and random effects model.   
 
3.2.1 Pooled OLS 
A pooled OLS-model is based on the principle of simply pooling together data from 
different individuals (in our case country-pairs) with no respect for individual 
inequality. In general, for an equation with two explanatory variables x! and x!, a 
pooled OLS-model can be written as: (Carter Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2012) y!" = β! + β!x!"# + β!x!"# + e!" 
where i corresponds to the ith individual and t to the tth time period. 
      The first thing to keep in mind is that the coefficient betas do not have any 
subscripts that denote individual characteristics or changes over time. The coefficient 
betas (including the intercept) in the pooled OLS are constant for all individuals over 
all time periods, hence it cannot allow for heterogeneity across individuals. For the 
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OLS estimators to be unbiased and consistent this exogeneity assumption must be 
fulfilled.  
      When adding the assumptions for the residual, there are little difference between 
the pooled model and the multiple regression model: 
1. E(𝑒!") = 0 (the residuals have zero mean) 
2. var(𝑒!") = E (𝑒!"! ) = 𝜎!! (constant variance, i.e. homoskedasticity) 
3. cov(𝑒!" , 𝑒!") = 0 for i≠j or t≠s (all error terms are uncorrelated over time for the 
same individual) 
4. cov(𝑒!",  𝑥!!") = 0 & cov(𝑒!",  𝑥!!") = 0 (error terms are uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables) 
 
      If we also suppose that the explanatory variables x1 and x2 are nonrandom, and all 
other criteria are satisfied, the pooled OLS-model will be the minimum variance 
linear unbiased estimator for our sample. (Carter Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2012)     
 
3.2.2 The Fixed Effects Model 
The main benefit with a fixed effects model is that it allows for individual 
characteristics, or individual heterogeneity, and therefore relaxes the assumption that 
all coefficients have to be the same for all individuals. If we still consider two 
explanatory variables this can be written as: (Carter Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2012) y!" = β!" + β!"x!"# + β!"x!"# + e!" 
The difference from the pooled OLS-model is the i subscripts related to the betas, 
implying that the beta coefficients can differentiate from individual to individual.  
      However this panel data model is not suitable for short and wide panels and since 
our data set is short and wide (N=351 > T=40), we have to make use of a simplified 
version of this model: (Carter Hill, Griffiths and Lim 2012) y!" = β!" + β!x!"# + β!x!"# + e!" 
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The i subscripts for the parameter betas (𝛽!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛽!) are gone which implies that these 
parameters are treated as constants for all individuals. The differences in behavioral 
characteristics between individuals, or heterogeneity, are now assumed to be captured 
by the intercept (𝛽!!). This is the key feature of a fixed effects model that the 
individual intercepts (often called fixed effects) are included to control for 
characteristics that are distinctive for one individual and that does not change over 
time. 
      The estimation technique we will make use of is called the fixed effects estimator 
and since our number of individuals (country-pairs) is relatively large this will be the 
most appropriate technique to use. We will illustrate this estimation technique below 
with the simplified fixed effects model as our starting point: (Carter Hill, Griffiths and 
Lim, 2012) y!" = β!" + β!x!"# + β!x!"# + e!",    t = 1,...,T     (1) 
 
Sum both sides of the equation and divide by T: 
 1T (y!" =   β!" +   β!x!"# +   β!x!"# +   e!")!!!!           (2) 
 
Since we know that the parameter betas do not change over time, we can simplify this 
as: 
ӯ! =   1T y!"!!!! =   β!" +   β! 1T x!"#!!!! +   β! 1T x!"#!!!! + e!" 
 ӯ! =   β!" +   β!x!" +   β!x!" +   e!      (3) 
 
We have now averaged the values of y!" over time and by subtracting (3) from (1) we 
get:   y!" −   ӯ! =   β! x!"# −   x!" +   β! x!"# −   x!" +   (e!" −   e!)     (4) 
 
Since y!" =   y!" −   ӯ! (and the same goes for x and e) this can be rewritten as:  
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y!" =   β!x!"# +   β!x!"# +   e!"     (5) 
 
We end up with (5) and the fixed effects model is here written in terms of deviations 
from individual means. Hence when calculating coefficients with the fixed effects 
estimator, the coefficients are only decided by the variation in the dependent and 
explanatory variables within that single individual over time. This also suggests that 
to obtain coefficient results using the fixed effects models, there will have to be some 
variation in the variables for an individual over time. For that reason the fixed effects 
model cannot estimate beta coefficients on time-invariant variables, i.e. variables that 
are persistent over time. 
     Noticeable is that the intercept term (β!") has disappeared in equation (5) above. 
These intercepts can be rediscovered by acknowledging that the least squares fitted 
regression tracks the point of the means: ӯ! =   β!" +   β!x!" +   β!x!" 
Where β! and β! are estimates from equation (5) and therefore we can calculate the 
individual intercepts, or fixed effects by: β!" =   ӯ! −   β!x!" −   β!x!",     
 
3.2.3 The Random Effects Model 
The random effects model and the simplified fixed effects model both assume that the 
individual heterogeneity is captured by the variation in the intercept. What distinguish 
the random effects model is that the individual differences are viewed as random 
rather than fixed, as in the fixed effects model. The random effects model presumes 
that the individuals are randomly sampled and therefore the intercept parameter (β!") 
is divided into two parts: (Carter Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2012) β!" =   β! +   u!     (6) 
Where β! is the fixed part and is referred to as the population average whereas u! is 
looked upon as the random individual heterogeneity from the population average, 
often called the random effects. If we incorporate (6) into (1) we will have: 
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y!" = (β! +   u!)+ β!x!"# + β!x!"# + e!"     (7) 
Rearranging terms will make us end up with: y!" = β! + β!x!!" + β!x!"# + (e!" +   u!) y!" = β! + β!x!"# + β!x!"# +   v!"     (8) 
The β! is now the intercept parameter and the error term v!" carries both the usual 
error term that we looked at earlier (e!") and the random individual effect (u!). The 
combined error term in a random effects model can be given by: v!" =   u! +   e!" 
The major difference regarding the residual assumptions in the random effects model 
and the pooled OLS-model is that the errors terms for the same individual are 
assumed to be correlated over time: (Carter Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2012) 
1. E(v!") = 0 (the residuals have zero mean) 
2. var(v!") =  σ!! +   σ!!  (constant variance, i.e. homoskedasticity) 
3. cov(v!", v!") = σ!!  for t≠s (error terms for individual i are correlated) 
4. cov(v!", v!") = 0 for i≠j (error terms for different individuals are uncorrelated) 
5. cov (e!",  x!"#) = 0 & cov (e!",  x!"#) = 0 (error term e!" are uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables) 
6. cov (u!",  x!"#) = 0 & cov (u!",  x!"#) = 0 (random effects are uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables) 
 
3.2.4 The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
When coefficient results have been obtained from the Pooled OLS-model, the fixed 
effects model and the random effects model we will perform a Breusch-Pagan (LM) 
test to determine whether the Pooled OLS-model is an appropriate estimation 
technique that fits the purpose of this thesis report. 
    The Breusch-Pagan test will help to examine if there is individual heterogeneity to 
account for across our data sample. The random individual effect (u!) and the 
assumptions for the residuals in the random effects model, both discussed above, are 
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the key components for this test alongside with the correlation equation given by: 
(Carter Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2012) 
ρ = corr   v!", v!" = cov  (v!", v!")var v!" var(v!") =    σ!!σ!! + σ!!               t ≠ s 
Suppose if σ!! = 0 this will lead to ρ = 0 and we can therefore conclude that 
differences amongst the individuals in our data set occur. The Breusch-Pagan test is 
consequently a simple hypothesis test stated by: H!:  σ!! = 0  H!:  σ!! ≠ 0  
If the null hypothesis can be rejected when performing the Breusch-Pagan test we can 
be assured that random individual effects are present in the data sample and the 
pooled OLS-model will be biased and inconsistent estimating the coefficient results. 
If this is the case, then the pooled OLS-model is disqualified as an estimation 
technique and we have to put our faith to either the fixed effects model or the random 
effects model. 
 
3.2.5 Hausman test 
To decide whether to apply the fixed effects model or the random effects model, in 
case the null hypothesis is rejected in the Breusch-Pagan test, a Hausman test is 
appropriate for making this decision.  
      The basic theory behind the Hausman test is that if there is no correlation between 
the random individual effect (u!) and any of the explanatory variables, then both the 
fixed effects model and the random effects will be consistent and generate estimators 
that in large samples will merge into the true beta parameters. However, if there is 
correlation between (u!) and any of the explanatory variables, the random effects 
model will be inconsistent and in large samples not converge into the true beta 
parameters, whilst the fixed effects model still would generate consistent parameters. 
In the presence of the correlation mentioned previously, we can expect differences in 
the estimates obtained from the two models. (Carter Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2012) 
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      The hypothesis testing connected to the Hausman test is as follows: H!:Corr   u!, x!"# =   0 H!:Corr   u!, x!"# ≠   0 
Hence if the null hypothesis is rejected when performing the Hausman test, the 
random effect models estimation parameters will be misleading and the fixed effects 
model should be put to practice.  
      A vital shortcoming of the Hausman test is that it cannot be exercised in 
combination with cluster-robust standard errors. The method of cluster-robust 
standard errors liberates the assumptions regarding the standard errors and this causes 
violations in the assumptions for the Hausman test.  
3.3 Our Regression Model 
As mentioned previously our regression model is influenced by the regression model 
used by Klein and Shambaugh (2004). The two models differentiate regarding the 
classification scheme of exchange rate regimes that are not classified as a currency 
union, direct peg or indirect peg. We will not include exchange rate volatility as one 
of the explanatory variables. This is because of the problem, discussed in section 2.1, 
to find a causal relationship between exchange rate volatility and bilateral trade - even 
when you do so the economic significance can be either positive or negative. Also, we 
are not studying the effects of exchange rate volatility on bilateral trade in the EU but 
the exchange rate regimes as such, hence the exclusion of this term from our model.   
 ln  (  T!,!,!) =   β!ln(GDP!" ∗ GDP!")+ β!ln  (Distance!")+ β!Border!,! + β!CU!,!,!+   β!Direct  peg!,!,! +   β!Indirect  peg  !,!,! + β!Floating!,!,!+ β!Other!,!,! + β!quarter! +   ε!,!,! 
 
where:  i = 1,2,… ,N j = 1,2,… ,N i ≠ j t = 1, 2,… ,T 
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Variable Explanation 𝐥𝐧  (  𝐓𝐢,𝐣,𝐭) Dependent variable. The natural logarithm of trade between 
country i and country j at time t. Time-variant variable.  𝐥𝐧(𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐢𝐭 ∗ 𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐣𝐭) The natural logarithm of the product of GDP in country i and 
country j at time t. Time-variant variable.  
 𝐥𝐧  (𝐃𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐢𝐣) The natural logarithm of distance between country i and 
country j in kilometres. Time-invariant variable.  𝐁𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐢,𝐣 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the counties share a land border. 
Time-invariant variable.  𝐂𝐔𝐢,𝐣,𝐭	   Dummy variable equal to 1 if country i and country j are 
members of the EMU at time t. Time-variant variable.  𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭  𝐩𝐞𝐠𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 Dummy variable equal to 1 if country i or country j is a 
member of the EMU and the other country has a fixed 
exchange rate to the euro at time t. Time-variant variable.  𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭  𝐩𝐞𝐠𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 Dummy variable equal to 1 if country i and country j have a 
fixed exchange rate to the euro at time t. Time-variant variable 
 𝐅𝐥𝐨𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a floating exchange rate 
between country i and country j at time t. Time-variant 
variable.  𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 Dummy variable equal to 1 if country i or country j has a fixed 
exchange rate to a currency basket and the other country does 
not have a floating exchange rate at time t.  
Or if country i or country j has a fixed exchange rate to the 
Euro with a volatility exceeding 2% in a given year and the 
other country does not have a floating exchange rate at time t. 
Time-variant variable.  
 𝐪𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐭 Dummy variable equal to 1 for all observations in a given 
quarter. 𝛆𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 Error term. Time-variant variable.  
 
 
What is important to keep in mind is that only one of the dummy variables that 
represents the current exchange rate regime between countries (Direct  peg, Indirect  peg, Floating and Other) or if the countries are members of EMU (CU) can 
be equal to one at the time. The values of these dummy variables explaining the 
exchange rate regime are based on the information given in Table A2 in the appendix. 
The table include information concerning which type of exchange rate regime that has 
been used in the 27 countries during the years 2003-2012. In seven cases (Cyprus, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia) the exchange rate regime 
have changed at least once during this period with the result that the dummy variables 
change value in the country pairs that involve at least one of these countries.   
      We make a distinction between countries with a fixed exchange rate to the euro 
and countries with a peg to a currency basket by separating them with dummy 
variables. This becomes actualized because of the fact that a few countries in our data 
set during some period have had a fixed exchange rate to different sorts of currency 
baskets. Since our aim is to compare the trade flows of EMU members and countries 
with a direct fixed exchange rate to the euro we want to exclude these observations 
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from impacting the Direct  peg dummy and therefore we have created a dummy 
variable, Other, whose purpose is to collect these observations.    
      We also make a distinction between countries with a direct and indirect fixed 
exchange rate. We illustrate the difference with an example; Denmark and Bulgaria 
have had a fixed exchange rate to the euro during the entire sample period, 2003-2012, 
resulting in that the Direct peg dummy is equal to 1 in the country pairs involving 
Denmark or Bulgaria and any member of the EMU. As a consequence of the two 
countries’ exchange rate regime there is an indirect fixed exchange rate between the 
two countries in question and we devote a dummy variable, Indirect peg, for 
observations of this kind.    
      To account for time trends and seasonality we have included forty dummy 
variables, one for each quarter of observation. These are included only for controlling 
purposes.  
      Table A3 in the appendix shows the maximum and minimum exchange rates for 
the currencies that during at least some part of the period 2003-2012 have been 
pegged to the euro. The volatility term clearly indicates that there have been 
differences in the way the fixed exchange rate regimes have been constructed and 
implemented. All countries besides Bulgaria and Hungary have been, or are, members 
of the ERM II and the volatility terms indicates that they have used the fluctuation 
possibility in the ERM II agreements in different fashion. We have made a 
classification scheme for those countries with a peg to the euro, proceeded from the 
classification used by Klein and Shambaugh (2004). Therefore a particular country 
with a peg to the euro is judged to have a direct peg if the exchange rate volatility, 
between the domestic currency and the euro, stays within a +/- 2 per cent band in a 
given year. We do not need to make any further distinctions here since the only two 
countries that have experienced exchange rate fluctuations exceeding these yearly 
limitations are Hungary (in five consecutive years between 2003 and 2007) and 
Slovakia (between year 2006 and 2008). The observations not eligible as direct pegs 
will be placed in the Other dummy. Given that the purpose of our analysis is to 
highlight the difference in trade flows among members of the EMU and countries 
with a direct peg to the euro, we will not suffer from adding these observations in the 
Other dummy – as the results provided from the variable Other is not of interest to us.   
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3.4 Data 
The data used in our research concern the 27 member countries of the European 
Union and refers to our chosen period of observation, 2003-2012. Our data set 
includes 14 040 observations and is categorized as unbalanced panel data because of 
some missing values. We have not made the data balanced by estimating the missing 
values because of the nature of these, for example GDP statistics for Greece are 
missing during 2011 and 2012. Since the Greek state could not manage to calculate 
the GDP during these years it is unlikely that our estimations would be close to reality.   
GDP statistics: The GDP statistics are collected from the European Commissions 
database, Eurostat. The data published at Eurostat is given in quarterly and early 
observations. To get as many observations as possible we use quarterly data in our 
research. There are seven missing values in this data set for Greece from the second 
quarter of 2011 until the end of 2012 with the result that our data include 1 075 GDP 
observations. The GDP is measured in current millions of euros.  
Trade statistics: The trade statistics are also gathered from Eurostat. The trade data is 
published in monthly figures. We have recalculated these into quarterly ones to fit the 
time period of the GDP statistics. The trade figures show the amount of quarterly 
trade, measured in current millions of euros, between the 27 countries during the ten 
years. The first five quarters include missing values for the country pairs involving 
Poland and Slovakia, with the result that our data set includes 13 542 trade 
observations.  
Distance: The distance between countries is measured as the distance between the 
countries’ capitals. The data is gathered from worldatlas.com.  
      The rest of the data used in our research relates to information integrated in the 
dummy variables and have been explained in-depth in section 3.3. Table 1 below 
shows the proportion of observations included in the different exchange rate regime 
dummy variables.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics, Exchange rate regime dummy variables  
Variable Number of total 
observations 
Number of 
observations equal to 
1 
Number of 
observations equal to 
0 
Number of 
observations equal to 
1 / Number of total 
observations 
𝐂𝐔𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 14040 3836 10204 27.32 % 
𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭  𝐩𝐞𝐠𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 14040 3096 10944 22.05 % 
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭  𝐩𝐞𝐠𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 14040 552 13488 3.92 % 
𝐅𝐥𝐨𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 14040 5580 8460 39.75 % 
𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 14040 976 13064 6.95 % 
 - - - 100 % 
 
      We feel the need to comment on our country selection. Table A1 in the appendix 
present the 27 countries year of entry in the EU as well as in the EMU, in the cases it 
concerns. Eleven countries have joined the union after 2003, a majority in the great 
enlargement in 2004, but are still included in our selection. The reason behind this is 
that they all were enrolled in the procedures of joining the union and in the same time 
have been full members in the majority of our research period.  
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Chapter 4 - Results and analysis 	  
4.1 How to interpret the coefficient results in Table 2 	  
The coefficient estimators obtained from the Pooled OLS-model, the fixed effects 
model and the random effects model are presented in Table 2 below. When 
interpreting the coefficient estimates it is important to keep in mind that we assume 
that all other variables are held constant, so called ceteris paribus.  
The dependent variable ln trade!"# is the natural logarithm of trade between country i 
and country j at time period t. The first two explanatory variables are ln (GDP!" ∗GDP!") and ln distance!", both given as natural logarithms and therefore the coefficient 
estimates from these two variables should be interpreted as a log-log regression. If we 
consider the coefficient result for ln (GDP!" ∗ GDP!") this is given by: %Δtrade!"# =   β !"#!"∗!"#!" ∗%Δ(GDP!" ∗ GDP!") 
Table 2. Estimation Results  
Dependent variable: ln trade!"#      Number of observations: 13542 
Variables         Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
    
Constant -4.322 (-34.08)*** -43.779 (-1.15) -5.083 (-9.92)*** 
ln (GDP!" ∗ GDP!") 0.875 (255.39)*** 1.084 (49.99)*** 0.931 (77.69)*** 
ln Distance!"#  -1.229 (-99.16)*** (omitted) -1.265 (-20.57)*** Border!"# 0.389 (14.94)*** (omitted) 0.290 (2.19)** Direct  peg!"# -0.108 (-5.97)*** -0.089 (-5.92)*** -0.078 (-5.20)*** Indirect  peg!"# 0.486 (10.06)*** -0.087 (-3.25)*** -0.071 (-2.66)*** Floating!"#  -0.026 (-1.87)* -0.169 (-8.51)*** -0.182 (-9.51)*** Other!"# 0.067 (2.33)** -0.132 (-7.16)*** -0.134 (-7.36)*** 
    
    
R-squared 
F-test 
LM-test 
Hausman test 
0.917 0.418 
155.29*** 
 
88.94*** 
0.416 
 
0.000015*** 
    
Notes: The estimation results for Direct peg, Indirect peg, Floating and Other are 
estimated with the variable Currency union as base group.   
The regressions are made with time variables but these are excluded in this table for 
presentation purposes. Table A4 in the appendix include time variables.  
***/**/* significant at 1 %/5 %/10 % level. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Let us suppose that the product of GDP between countries i and j increase with 1 % at 
time t, everything else held constant. The beta coefficient related to GDP!" ∗ GDP!" is 
0.875, using the Pooled OLS-model, we thereby get: %Δtrade!"# =   0.875 ∗ 1  % = 0.875  % 
Accordingly, if (GDP!" ∗ GDP!") increase with 1 % we would expect a 0.875 % 
increase in trade between the two countries i and j, ceteris paribus, given the Pooled 
OLS estimators. The same interpretation should be used for all estimates regarding ln 
(GDP!" ∗ GDP!") and ln distance!". 
      The next explanatory variable, border!", is a dummy variable given the value 1 if 
the countries i and j share a border and 0 if they do not. The estimated beta 
coefficients of border!" should be interpreted as the effect on bilateral trade if 
countries i and j share a border.  Since the dependent variable is expressed as a natural 
logarithm, the exact percentage change in trade!"# given a movement in the dummy 
variable from 0 to 1 is: 
%Δtrade!"# = 100 ∗ (e!!"#$%#!" − 1) 
Reading of the Table 2 above, the border!"  beta coefficient obtained from the Pooled 
OLS-model is 0.389, inserting this figure in the equation above gives us: %Δtrade!"# = 100 ∗ e!.!"# − 1 ≈ 47.55 % 
The bilateral trade for two countries within the European Union in general is 47.55 % 
higher if the country pair shares a border compared to if they do not, during the period 
2003 to 2012 given the Pooled OLS estimates. All three coefficient results from the 
variable border!" should be understood in the same way as described above.  
      What is significant to remember regarding the dummy variables Direct peg, 
Indirect peg, Floating and Other is that their coefficient estimates stand in comparison 
to the base group, CU. The coefficient results for Direct peg should consequently 
thereby be taken as the effects on bilateral trade between countries i and j at time 
period t, for applying a direct fixed exchange rate regime instead of both being 
members of the EMU. The exact percentage change is given by: 
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%Δtrade!"# = 100 ∗ (e!!"#$%&  !"#!"# − 1) 
If we consider the coefficient results regarding the Direct peg, once again obtained 
from the Pooled OLS, from Table 2 and insert this to the equation above: %Δtrade!"# = 100 ∗ e!!.!"# − 1   ≈   −10.24 % 
The interpretation of this result is that a country pair involving one country that is a 
member of the EMU and the other pegs to the euro will trade 10.24 % less than if 
both countries were members of the EMU, according to the Pooled OLS-model.  
      The same inference should be applied for all the dummy variables Direct peg, 
Indirect peg, Floating and Other regardless of what model the coefficient estimates 
are obtained from.     
4.2 Similarities and differences across the models 	  
Studying the coefficient results we can conclude that there are both similarities and 
differences across the three regression models. Acknowledging that the intercept (or 
constant) is much larger in absolute values in the fixed effects model, although it is 
statistically insignificant, is a good beginning. As stated in the theory section, in the 
fixed effects model potential individual heterogeneity is captured by the intercept 
which this is the proof of. It is hard to argue that the intercepts are economic 
significant since it is difficult to imagine negative bilateral trade but the intercepts are 
nonetheless crucial for the models themselves. 
      Regarding the variables ln (GDP!" ∗ GDP!"), ln distance!" and border!" there are 
little differences in the coefficient estimators across the models. A part from the 
estimated coefficients  border!", obtained from the random effects model, all estimates 
are statistically significant at the 1 % level. All three models suggest that an increase 
in the product of two countries’ GDP will boost their bilateral trade with only minor 
differences in the magnitude of this increase.        
      Noticeable is that the fixed effects model cannot provide estimates for the time-
invariant variables ln distance!" and border!" due to the lack of variation within these 
variables. Although the Pooled OLS-model and the random effects model give fairly 
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consistent estimations of these two variables. If the distance between country i and 
country j increase by 1 % the Pooled OLS predicts a decrease in bilateral trade by 
1.229 %, whilst the random effects model suggests a decrease by 1.265 %.  
The effects of two countries sharing a border on bilateral trade are as follows: Pooled  OLS ∶   %Δtrade!"# = 100 ∗ e!.!"# − 1 ≈ 47.55 % Random  effects  model ∶ %Δtrade!"# = 100 ∗ e!.!"# − 1 ≈ 33.64  %  
The bilateral trade for two countries within the European Union is in general 47.55 % 
higher if the country pair shares a border compared to if they do not, during the period 
2003 to 2012 given the Pooled OLS estimates. The corresponding figure using the 
random effects model is 33.64 %.                        
      The major distinctions in the results are found when we evaluate the coefficient 
estimations for the dummy variables Direct peg, Indirect peg, Floating and Other. The 
fixed effects model and the random effects model give consistent rankings and the 
magnitude of the coefficient results do not differ sufficiently. However, the results 
from the Pooled OLS-model provide us with a completely different set of rankings. 
According to the results from the Pooled OLS if a country pair’s exchange rate 
regime is characterized as Indirect peg or Other, the two countries would be better off 
than if both countries were a part of the EMU – in terms of bilateral trade. An indirect 
peg would increase trade between country i and country j by 62.58 % compared to if 
both countries i and j were members of the EMU, according to the Pooled OLS 
estimation. Whilst the fixed effects model suggests a decrease in bilateral trade by 
8.33 % and the random effects model a decrease by 6.85 %. 
      Another difference is that the R-square is much higher with the Pooled OLS-
model compared to the two others. The difference occurs due to the fact that in the 
fixed effects model and the random effects model the intercept captures the individual 
heterogeneity or random effects. Due to shortcomings in the estimation technique, the 
explanatory powers in the intercept are lost in the fixed effects model and the random 
effects model. Therefore, in reality, there are no differences in explanatory power 
across the three models.  
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4.3 Breusch-Pagan test 	  
To conclude whether the coefficient results obtained from the Pooled OLS-model, the 
fixed effects model or the random effects model reflects the true parameter betas to 
the greatest extent – we have performed a Breusch-Pagan test (LM-test). This test will 
help us to assess if the results from the Pooled OLS-model are reliable and consistent 
given the nature of our dataset. If not, we have to apply the fixed effects model or the 
random effects model to justify the results from our regression model. 
      The LM test basically examines if there are random individual effects across 
entities. The null hypothesis can thereby be simplified and interpreted as that there are 
no individual heterogeneity present across country pairs.  
      The outcome of the Breusch-Pagan test is both unambiguous and persuasive, 
displayed in Table A5 in the appendix, as it rejects the null hypothesis at any of the 
conventional significance levels. Hence we can rule out the theory that there are no 
individual differences amongst the country pairs in our sample, or in other words that 
the bilateral trade is determined by identical factors within all country pairs.  
      The presence of individual differences between the country pairs in our sample is, 
in hindsight, rational since we are dealing with such a complex greatness as bilateral 
trade between countries. The driving forces of trade between one country pair are not 
equal to the driving forces of trade for another country pair. The differences can be 
attributed to country-specific conditions that arise due to inequality in for example 
social, economical, political, geographical and historical matters.  
      The Pooled OLS-model cannot allow for heterogeneity for its estimators to be 
unbiased and consistent. Through the Breusch-Pagan test we have proved that 
individual heterogeneity is present in our data set and therefore we can disqualify the 
Pooled OLS-model as the best suitable estimation technique for our regression 
analysis. Hence, to obtain trustworthy and unbiased coefficient estimators, we have to 
make use of either the fixed effects model or the random effects model. 
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4.4 Hausman test 	  
To decide between the fixed effects model and the random effects model we have 
executed a Hausman test. The core of this test, further discussed in the theory section, 
is to examine if the unique random effects (𝑢!) are correlated with the independent 
variables in our regression. The null hypothesis is that the random effects are not 
correlated with the regressors and that the random effects model is therefore 
preferred. Whilst the alternative hypothesis is that 𝑢! is correlated with the regressors 
and the fixed effects model is the superior estimation technique. 
     The result of the Hausman test is displayed in Table A6 in the appendix and it is 
convincing since the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 % significance level. The 
outcome of the Hausman test states that the unique effects are correlated with the 
independent variables within our model, thus the random effects model is biased and 
its beta estimators will not merge into the true beta parameters in large samples. 
Nevertheless the coefficient estimators obtained with the fixed effects are still 
unbiased and consistent.  
     The presence of correlation between the random effects and the regressors in our 
model is as well anticipated. Everything with an explanatory power of bilateral trade 
between two countries, not included in our model, ends up in the residual. If the 
omitted variable is correlated with the regressors, then the unique random effect (𝑢!) 
of that omitted variable will also be correlated with the explanatory variables in our 
model. For example, a common language might influence bilateral trade within a 
country-pair. If so, it can be argued that having a common language is correlated with 
the distance between the two countries and whether they share a border or not, two 
variables included in our regression model.    
4.5 Shortcomings with the standard errors 	  
We have also tested for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, visualized in Table A7 
and A8 in the appendix. The outcome of the tests states that both heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation are present within our data set. This will de facto lead to 
underestimated standard errors and consequently the t-statistics will be upward 
biased. To correct for this it is appropriate to perform a Huber-White’s test, but since 
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this requires clustering of the panel data it cannot be used in combination with a 
Hausman test. Because of this conflict we are not able to use cluster-robust standard 
errors.   
      Another thing to be aware of is that the data set we make use of has the same 
characteristics as those of a dyadic regression. This means that our observations are 
not fully independent from one another since the residual for country pair x is 
correlated to the residual of another country pair that includes one of the countries 
from country pair x. For example: 
 
Corr (ε!"#,!"#,!, ε!"#,!"#,!) ≠ 0 
 
The presence of correlated error terms across our sample complicates the calculations 
of the standard errors in our model. (Fafchamps and Söderbom, 2013) In general the 
standard errors will once again be underestimated and influence the t-statistics.  
      We are therefore aware of the shortcomings with the standard errors in the model 
but, as mentioned above, we cannot correct for this since we had to perform the 
Hausman test to conclude which of the three models that were most suitable for our 
data set. 
4.6 Core results from the fixed effects model 	  
Ruling out both the Pooled OLS-model and the random effects model, we will hereon 
focus on the coefficient estimates given by the fixed effects model. First and foremost 
when drawing conclusions about the relationship between one of the explanatory 
variables and bilateral trade, we still have to hold everything else constant. Secondly, 
all coefficient results discussed in this section are statistically significant and therefore 
only the economic significance needs to be questioned from now on.   
      The outcome of the fixed effects model suggests that an increase in the product of 
two countries GDP at time period t, will cause an upswing in bilateral trade amongst 
the two countries of consideration roughly equivalent to the percentage increase in the 
product of GDP. If the product of Sweden’s and Germany’s GDP increases by 1 % at 
any given time during the sample period, we expect the trade between Sweden and 
Germany to enhance with approximately 1.084 %.  
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       As mentioned previously the fixed effects model could not provide coefficient 
results for the time-invariant variables ln distance!" and border!". Since these 
coefficient results will not contribute to fulfill the purpose of our thesis analysis, we 
are not distressed by this fact. Nonetheless both the Pooled OLS and the random 
effects model give us insight into to effects of bilateral trade given the distance 
between the two countries and whether they share a border or not. Both models 
unambiguously state that an increase in distance within a country pair will result in a 
decrease in trade between the concerned countries. As well as countries that share a 
border tend to trade more with one another than countries that do not share a border.  
      The variables of greatest interest are of course the dummy variables describing the 
characteristics of the exchange rate regimes between country i and country j at time 
period t. From Table 2 above we can transform the coefficient results to the exact 
percentage change, notice that the percentage change for each variable stand in 
comparison to if both countries i and j were members of the EMU at time period t: 
Direct peg | CU: %Δtrade!"# = 100 ∗ e!!.!"# − 1   ≈   −8.52  %  
Indirect peg | CU: %Δtrade!"# = 100 ∗ e!!.!"# − 1   ≈   −8.33  %  
Floating | CU: %Δtrade!"# = 100 ∗ e!!.!"# − 1   ≈   −15.55  %  
Other | CU: %Δtrade!"# = 100 ∗ e!!.!"# − 1   ≈   −12.37  %  
We can conclude that the variable CU is superior, in terms of bilateral trade, to the 
four other exchange rate regimes. For convenience of analysis we can converse the 
relationship and express the percentage changes in how much better of countries i and 
j are being members of the EMU compared to exercising any other exchange rate 
regime, in terms of trade: 
CU | Direct peg: %Δtrade!"# ≈   9.32  %  
CU | Indirect peg: %Δtrade!"#   ≈   9.10  %  
CU | Floating: %Δtrade!"#   ≈   18.41  %  
CU | Other: %Δtrade!"#   ≈   14.11  %  
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The estimated results for the variables Direct peg and Indirect peg are more or less 
equal. This indicates that the trade effects involving a country pair where country i is 
a member of the EMU and country j pegs to the euro are similar to those involving a 
country pair where both countries peg to euro. This is probably due to the fact that 
country pairs categorized as direct pegs or indirect pegs have experienced very low 
levels of exchange rate fluctuations between the domestic currency and the euro, as 
indicated in Table A3 in the appendix.  
      As our results are presented with the variable CU as base group; we can not speak 
in terms of impact on trade of having or not having a certain exchange rate regime 
hence the figures stand in comparison with the base group. The reason to this 
presentation technique is that we are interested in the difference between the variable 
CU and Direct peg. As a consequence of this we cannot make a direct comparison 
with previous research. However, we can conclude that the huge treatment effect of a 
currency union on trade found by Rose (2000) does not reflect our findings. 
Remember the critique that Rose received concerning the composition of countries 
using a common currency globally, them being small and poor. You would describe 
our sample of countries using a common currency in more or less opposite terms. 
With regards to these circumstances and the research that followed Rose’s these 
results did not come as a big surprise.     
      Despite it is beyond our research question the finding that a direct fixed exchange 
rate regime significantly outperforms a floating regime is interesting, not the least 
from a policy perspective. As discussed previously there is no coherency in the 
research on this topic. What is a fact though is that when using a similar technique, 
measuring the impact using dummy variables instead of exchange rate volatility 
terms, as Adam and Cobham (2007) we observe the same relationship, but not as 
strong. Adam and Cobham (2007) found a positive impact on trade of 56.8 % for 
country pairs classified in the same structure as our variable Direct peg and a negative 
impact of 17.5 % if both countries used a floating exchange rate regime. Adam and 
Cobham (2007) utilized a pooled OLS model when conducting their research and, as 
we have stated, the results obtained from this model should be interpreted with 
caution when working with data set with this content. It seems likely to assume that 
their data set has the same structure when it comes to the issue of heterogeneity, but 
this is a question that they do not raise in their report. However, we can state that our 
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results, taking fixed effects into account, indicates that a direct fixed exchange rate 
regime is better then a floating ditto in terms of trade.  
      The result measuring the difference between CU and Direct peg is our core 
finding, indicating that two countries that are members of the EMU trade 9.32 % 
more than if one country is member of the EMU and the other have a direct peg to the 
euro. If we once again compare our findings with the results from Adam and Cobham 
(2007) we observe the same overall relationship but our results differentiate in 
magnitude. Even if our figures are not directly comparable, Adam and Cobham 
(2007) observe a greater difference between the two regimes; 139.8 % for CU and 
56.8 % for Direct peg. This study have a significantly longer period of observation 
and you can once again raise the question about selection influence; that the 
composition of countries using a common currency historically and globally are not 
among the richest you find around the globe. The critique Rose (2000) received from 
Nitsch (2002) and Persson (2001) can reasonably be applied to this study as well.  
      To summarize, our findings obtained from the exchange rate dummy variables 
indicate that the stronger the monetary commitment is between countries the greater 
the positive impact will be on trade amidst the countries in question.   
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 	  
The purpose of this thesis report has been to estimate the difference in impact on 
intra-EU bilateral trade between an EMU membership and a direct fixed exchange 
rate regime. This have been done using a modified gravity model of trade and three 
different estimation techniques, the Pooled OLS-model, the fixed effects model and 
the random effects model. The trade effects of the different exchange rate regimes are 
captured using dummy variables. We can conclude, from the estimated results given 
by the fixed effects model, that countries trade 9.32 % more if they both use the euro 
as national currency than if one country is a member of the EMU and the other have a 
direct peg to the euro, i.e. that their national currencies are fixed. As a consequence of 
this we cannot reject our null hypothesis stating that an EMU membership has 
exceeded a direct fixed exchange rate regime to the euro in terms of gains in intra-EU 
bilateral trade.  
      In the theory section we argued that a currency union facilitates monetary 
efficiency. Our estimated results put figures on the value of this monetary efficiency, 
incorporating matters such as the removal of transaction cost and exchange rate 
uncertainty etc. However, this efficiency only applies in terms of intra EU-trade. 
What would be interesting for further studies to examine is what the relationship 
would look like if the data set was expanded to include trade with nations globally 
and this monetary efficiency no longer applies. Would a membership in the EMU still 
be superior to other exchange rate regimes?    
      Even if the Eurozone undoubtedly have a positive impact on intra EU-trade this 
does not by any means imply that joining the EMU is a rational decision on all levels 
and for all countries. The motive for a country to join the EMU is a far more complex 
matter and covers various topics that need to be taken in to consideration apart from 
trade. How will the adoption of the euro affect levels of inflation? How will the 
inability to conduct an independent monetary policy affect the nation’s overall 
economic environment? The list of these questions is extensive and must all be placed 
in the balance pan; which these questions are and the how the balance pan will tip are 
there as many answers to as there are economists.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. EU and EMU members and year of entry  	  
Country	   EU	  (year	  of	  entry)	   EMU	  (year	  of	  entry)	  
Austria	   1995	   1999	  
Belgium	   1958	   1999	  
Cyprus	   2004	   2008	  
Estonia	   2004	   2011	  
Finland 1995	   1999	  
France	   1958	   1999	  
Germany	   1958	   1999	  
Greece	   1981	   2001	  
Italy	   1958	   1999	  
Luxembourg	   1958	   1999	  
Portugal	   1986	   1999	  
Malta 2004	   2008	  
Slovakia	   2004	   2009	  
Slovenia	   2004	   2007	  
Spain	   1986	   1999	  
Bulgaria	   2007	   -­‐	  
Czech Republic	   2004	   -­‐	  
Denmark	   1973	   -­‐	  
Hungary 2004	   -­‐	  
Latvia4	   2004	   -­‐	  
Lithuania	   2004	   -­‐	  
Poland	   2004	   -­‐	  
Romania	   2007	   -­‐	  
Sweden	   1995	   -­‐	  
The United Kingdom	   1973	   -­‐	  
Source: The European Commission (2014) 	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Latvia	  joined	  the	  EMU	  in	  January	  2014	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Table A2. Currency and exchange rate regime 2003-2012 
	  
Source: European Commission (2014) and the European Central Bank (2014)	  
Country	   Currency	   Exchange Rate Regime	  
Austria	   Euro	   Member of EMU 	  
Belgium	   Euro	   Member of EMU 	  
Bulgaria	   Lev	   Fixed exchange rate to the 
euro 	  
Czech Republic	   Koruna	   Floating exchange rate 	  
Cyprus Pound, Euro 2002-2003 Fixed exchange 
rate to SDR, 2003-2007 
Fixed exchange rate to the 
euro, 2008- Member of the 
EMU 
Denmark	   Krona	   Fixed exchange rate to the 
euro	  
Estonia	   Kroon, Euro	   2003-2010 fixed exchange 
rate to the euro, 2011- 
Member of the EMU	  
Finland	   Euro	   Member of the EMU	  
France 	   Euro	   Member of the EMU	  
Germany	   Euro	   Member of the EMU	  
Greece	   Euro	   Member of the EMU	  
Hungary	   Forint	   2003-2007 Fixed exchange 
rate to the euro 2008- 
Floating exchange rate	  
Italy	   Euro	   Member of the EMU	  
Latvia	   Lats	   2003-2004 Fixed exchange 
rate to SDR 2005- Fixed 
exchange rate to the euro	  
Lithuania	   Litas	   Fixed exchange rate to the 
euro 	  
Luxembourg	   Euro	   Member of the EMU	  
Malta	   Euro	   29/5 2005-2007 Fixed 
exchange rate to the euro 
2008- Member of the EMU	  
Netherlands	   Euro	   Member of the EMU	  
Poland	   Złoty	  	   Floating exchange rate	  
Portugal	   Euro	   Member of the EMU	  
Romania	   Leu	   Floating exchange rate	  
Slovakia	   Koruna, Euro	   2003-27/11 2005 Floating 
exchange rate, 28/11 2005-
2008 Fixed exchange rate to 
the euro, 2009- Member of 
the EMU 	  
Slovenia	   Tolar, Euro	   2003-26/4 2004 Floating 
exchange rate, 27/4 2004-
2006 Fixed exchange rate to 
the euro, 2007- Member of 
the EMU	  
Spain	   Euro	   Member of the EMU	  
Sweden	   Krona	   Floating exchange rate	  
The United Kingdom	   Pound	   Floating exchange rate	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Table A3. Fixed exchange rate regimes to the euro 2003-2012 	  
Period Country Currency €1=  
Max 
(YYMMDD)/ 
Min 
(YYMMDD)5 
Volatility 
over the 
given 
period 
ERM II  
status 
2003-2012 Bulgaria Lev 3,455 (050528)/ 
3,452 (050403) 
<1 % No 
2003-2012 Denmark Krona 7,467 (060207)/ 
7,424 (030425) 
<1 % Yes, 1999 
-  
2003-2010 Estonia Kroon 15,647 (040701/ 
15,622 (030201)  
<1 % Yes, 28 
June 2004 
- 2010 
2003-2007 Hungary Forint 283,35 (060714)/ 
234,72 (030113) 
≈ 17 % No 
2005-2013 Latvia Lats 0,710 (101228)/ 
0,696 (050614) 
 
<2 % Yes, 2 
May 
2005-
2013 
2/5 2005-
2007 
Malta Lire 0,4295 (050601)/ 
0,4273 (060501) 
<1% Yes, 2/5-
2005-
2007 
28/11 
2005-2008 
Slovakia Koruna 38,307 (060701)/ 
30,087 (081201) 
≈ 21 % Yes, 
28/11 
2005-
2008 
27/4 2004-
2007 
Slovenia Tolar 239,512(070101)/ 
235,216 (050101) 
<2 % Yes, 28/4 
2004 - 
2007 
2003-2012 Lithuania Litas 3.4545 (040401)/ 
3.4520 (040325) 
 
< 1% Yes, 26/6 
2004 -  
2003-2007 Cyprus Pound 0,5865 (030501)/ 
0,5692 (041001) 
< 3% Yes, 2/5 
2005-
2007 Source:	  The	  European	  Central	  Bank	  (2014)	  and	  oanda.com	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  exchange	  rate	  for	  the	  currencies	  no	  longer	  in	  use	  are	  based	  on	  monthly	  figures	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Table A4. Complete regression results. 
Variables Pooled OLS Fixed effects model Random effects 
model 
Constant -4.322 (-34.08)*** -43.779 (-1.15) -5.083 (-9.92)*** 
ln (𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐢𝐭 ∗ 𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐣𝐭) 0.875 (255.39)*** 1.084 (49.99)*** 0.931 (77.69)*** 
ln 𝐃𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐢𝐣 -1.229 (-99.16)*** (omitted) -1.265 (-20.57)*** 𝐁𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐣 0.389 (14.94)*** (omitted) 0.290 (2.19)** 𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭  𝐩𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐣𝐭 -0.108 (-5.97)*** -0.089 (-5.92)*** -0.078 (-5.20)*** 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭  𝐩𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐣𝐭 0.486 (10.06)*** -0.087 (-3.25)*** -0.071 (-2.66)*** 𝐅𝐥𝐨𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐢𝐣𝐭 -0.026 (-1.87)* -0.169 (-8.51)*** -0.182 (-9.51)*** 𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐣𝐭 0.067 (2.33)** -0.132 (-7.16)*** -0.134 (-7.36)*** 
q2 0.057 (1.01) 0.052 (2.06)** 0.054 (2.14)** 
q3 -0.029 (–0.52) -0.039 (-1.57) -0.033 (-1.30) 
q4 0.030 (0.54) 0.017 (0.67) 0.029 (1.16) 
q5 0.011 (0.19) -0.007 (-0.29) 0.009 (0.34) 
q6 0.022 (0.41) -0.014 (-0.59) 0.003 (0.11) 
q7 -0.030 (-0.55) -0.067 (-2.72)*** -0.045 (-1.83)* 
q8 0.065 (1.20) 0.013 (0.51) 0.041 (1.67)* 
q9 -0.017 (-0.32) -0.079 (-3.21)*** -0.046 (-1.87)* 
q10 0.042 (0.77) -0.029 (-1.18) 0.011 (0.45) 
q11 -0.005 (-0.10) -0.086 (-3.42)*** -0.040 (-1.63) 
q12 0.075 (1.38) -0.014 (-0.56) 0.038 (1.53) 
q13 0.075 (1.36) -0.017 (-0.67) 0.041 (1.65)* 
q14 0.094 (1.74)* -0.007 (-0.26) 0.059 (2.34)** 
q15 0.005 (-0.10) -0.105 (-3.98)*** -0.033 (-1.32) 
q16 0.065 (1.25) -0.060 (-2.23)** 0.020 (0.79) 
q17 0.019 (0.36) -0.123 (-4.51)*** -0.034 (-1.32) 
q18 0.029 (0.54) -0.123 (-4.39)*** -0.026 (-1.00) 
q19 -0.013 (-0.25) -0.185 (-6.52)*** -0.082 (-3.17)*** 
q20 0.019 (0.37) -0.147 (-5.11)*** -0.038 (-1.47) 
q21 -0.005 (-0.09) -0.200 (-6.87)*** -0.086 (-3.30)*** 
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q22 0.017 (0.32) -0.182 (-6.17)*** -0.063 (-2.42)** 
q23 -0.029 (-0.55) -0.236 (-7.92)*** -0.114 (-4.35)*** 
q24 -0.071 (-1.36) -0.254 (-8.79)*** -0.143 (-5.52)*** 
q25 -0.183 (-3.48)*** -0.358 (-12.96)*** -0.265 (-10.39)*** 
q26 -0.139 (-2.61)*** -0.315 (-11.42)*** -0.223 (-8.73)*** 
q27 -0.128 (-2.41)** -0.300 (-10.81)*** -0.206 (-8.05)*** 
q28 -0.089 (-1.67)* -0.268 (-9.63)*** -0.172 (-6.73)*** 
q29 -0.141 (-2.65)*** -0.332 (-11.76)*** -0.231 (-8.98)*** 
q30 -0.047 (-0.87) -0.236 (-8.29)*** -0.131 (-5.09)*** 
q31 -0.073 (-1.37) -0.269 (-9.34)*** -0.160 (-6.18)*** 
q32 -0.010 (-0.20) -0.211 (-7.28)*** -0.100 (-3.83)*** 
q33 -0.026 (-0.49) -0.242 (-8.19)*** -0.123 (-4.71)*** 
q34 0.050 (0.91) -0.197 (-6.53)*** -0.075 (-2.82)*** 
q35 -0.024 (-0.44) -0.271 (-8.95)*** -0.148 (-5.53)*** 
q36 0.018 (0.33) -0.229 (-7.59)*** -0.107 (-4.01)*** 
q37 0.010 (0.19) -0.238 (-7.82)*** -0.113 (-4.23)*** 
q38 0.035 (0.64) -0.222 (-7.26)*** -0.095 (-3.55)*** 
q39 -0.026 (-0.46) -0.279 (-9.03)*** -0.149 (-5.52)*** 
q40 0.011 (0.20) -0.251 (-8.13)*** -0.121 (-4.49)*** 
R-squared 0.917 0.418 
 
0.416 
 
F-test  155.29*** 
 
 
LM-test    
0.000015*** 
Hausman test   
88.94*** 
 
Notes: The estimation results for Direct peg, Indirect peg, Floating and Other are estimated 
with the variable Currency union as base group.   
The estimation results for all time variables from q2 to q40 are estimated with q1 as base 
group. 
***/**/* significant at 1 %/5 %/10 % level. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table A5. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects. ln trade!"    uniq, t = Xb + u uniq + e[uniq, t] 
 Var sd = sqrt (Var) ln trade!" 5.556 2.357 
e 0.094 0.307 
u 0.353 0.594 
 
Test: Var(u) = 0 
chibar2(01) = 0.000015 
Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000 
 
Table A6. Hausman test. 
Variables (b) 
fe 
(B) 
re 
(b-B) 
Difference 
Sqrt (diag(V_b-
v_B)) 
S.E. 
ln (𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐢𝐭 ∗𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐣𝐭) 1.084 0.931 0.152 0.018 𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭  𝐩𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐣𝐭 -0.089 -0.078 -0.011 0.002 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭  𝐩𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐣𝐭 -0.087 -0.071 -0.016 0.002 𝐅𝐥𝐨𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐢𝐣𝐭 -0.170 -0.182 0.013 0.005 𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐣𝐭 -0.132 -0.134 0.002 0.002 
q2 0.052 0.054 -0.002 . 
q3 -0.039 -0.033 -0.007 . 
q4 0.017    0.029 -0.012 . 
q5 -0.007 0.009 -0.009 . 
q6 -0.014 0.003 -0.017 . 
q7 -0.067 -0.045 -0.022 0.00142 
q8 0.013 0.041 -0.028 0.00251 
q9 -0.079 -0.046 -0.034 0.00330 
q10 -0.029 0.011 -0.040 0.00423 
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q11 -0.086 -0.040 -0.046 0.00493 
q12 -0.014 0.038 -0.052 0.00574 
q13 -0.017 0.041 -0.058 0.00649 
q14 -0.007 0.059 -0.065 0.00732 
q15 -0.105 -0.033 -0.072 0.00815 
q16 -0.060 0.020 -0.080 0.00915 
q17 -0.123 -0.034 -0.091 0.01052 
q18 -0.123 -0.026 -0.097 0.01120 
q19 -0.185 -0.082 -0.103 0.01194 
q20 -0.147 -0.038 -0.109 0.01261 
q21 -0.200 -0.086 -0.114 0.01323 
q22 -0.182 -0.063 -0.119 0.01385 
q23 -0.236 -0.114 -0.121 0.01410 
q24 -0.254 -0.143 -0.111 0.01287 
q25 -0.358 -0.265 -0.093 0.01069 
q26 -0.315 -0.223 -0.093 0.01057 
q27 -0.300 -0.206 -0.094 0.01073 
q28 -0.268 -0.172 -0.010 0.01095 
q29 -0.332 -0.231 -0.101 0.01158 
q30 -0.236 -0.131 -0.105 0.01208 
q31 -0.269 -0.160 -0.109 0.01258 
q32 -0.211 -0.100 -0.111 0.01287 
q33 -0.242 -0.123 -0.119 0.01369 
q34 -0.197 -0.075 -0.122 0.01406 
q35 -0.271 -0.148 -0.123 0.01419 
q36 -0.229 -0.107 -0.122 0.01404 
q37 -0.238 -0.113 -0.125 0.01438 
q38 -0.222 -0.095 -0.126 0.01458 
q39 -0.279 -0.149 -0.130 0.01502 
q40 -0.251 -0.121 -0.130 0.01501 
 
42	  	  
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(42) = (b-B) ‘ [(V_b-V_B)	  ^ (-1)] (b-B) = 88.94 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Table A7. Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity. 
H0: Constant variance 
chi2(1) = 694.14 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
Table A8. Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(1, 350) = 26.546 
Prob > F = 0.0000 	  	  
 
